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Supreme Court Overrules Sixth Circuit Test Required for Members of “Majority Groups” To Claim Discrimination Under Title VII

On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States released its decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, which originated out of the Sixth Circuit in Ohio. Plaintiff Marlean Ames (“Ames”) sued her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (the “Department”), claiming she was denied various promotions and related job opportunities because she is a heterosexual woman.

Ames was first hired by the Department in 2004 as an executive secretary. In 2014, she was promoted to serve as a program administrator. In 2019, Ames applied to be promoted to a management position in the Department’s Office of Qualify and Improvement but was not selected. Within days of her interview for this management position, Ames’ supervisors demoted her to the position she was initially hired for; she suffered a significant pay cut as a result. The Department replaced Ames with a gay man, and a lesbian woman was hired for the Office of Qualify and Improvement position. Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She also sued the Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the Department denied her promotion and demoted her on the basis of her sexual orientation.

The Sixth Circuit traditionally imposed an extra test on persons in “majority groups” who sued for discrimination under Title VII. This test required majority group members to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). Typically, this test could be satisfied by showing that “a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue[,]” or by producing “statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination by the employer against members of the majority group.” Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002); Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 615 (6th Cir. 2003)). Finding that Ames did not satisfy this test, the Sixth Circuit denied her claim and ruled in favor of the Department.

In reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court found that this “background circumstances” test did not align with the either the text of Title VII itself or the numerous discrimination cases decided since the law’s enactment. The Court relied on the phrasing of Title VII which applies to “any individual” and makes no reference to majority or minority groups; Title VII expressly makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Court interpreted Congress’ use of the word “any” to mean that the protections of Title VII apply to everyone, regardless of whether a person belongs to a majority or minority group; the Court thus opined that “Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.” Ames, 145 S.Ct. 1540, 1546.

The Ames decision relied on various other federal court rulings which recognized that Title VII’s protections apply to all employees equally, regardless of a person’s majority or minority status. In 1971, the Court recognized that Title VII prohibits “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority[.]” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Just a few years later in 1976, the Court rejected an argument that white employees could not be discriminated against. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). As recently as 2020, the Court recognized that Title VII “protects both sexes from discrimination, and does so equally.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 659 (2020). The Court also found that the “background circumstances” test imposed too rigid a standard on plaintiffs given that actions under Title VII are not meant to be “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The “background circumstances” test was thus deemed invalid as “subjecting all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case.” Ames, 145 S.Ct. at 1546-47 (emphasis maintained).

As a result of the Court’s decision, an employee in a majority group(s) who claims his or her employer discriminated against them will no longer be required to satisfy the “background circumstances” test in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Though Pennsylvania is located within the Third Circuit, the recency of the Court’s decision may still result in an overall increase of Title VII claims, particularly for majority group employees who may have previously been unaware of their ability to allege workplace discrimination.

Takeaways:

  • Certain federal circuit courts previously required plaintiffs in majority groups who claimed discrimination to prove the existence of certain “background circumstances.” This test was designed to demonstrate that the employer actually discriminated against a majority group. The test was meant to recognize that discrimination against minority groups may occur more frequently than discrimination against majority groups.
  • The Supreme Court relied on a plain reading of Title VII’s phrasing to reinforce the idea that it applies to all employees/plaintiffs equally, regardless of whether they belong to a minority or a majority group.
  • The Ames decision does not alter Title VII’s protected characteristics, but merely finds that Title VII applies equally to both the minority and majority categories of each characteristic.
  • Though the Ames decision primarily impacts the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, it is possible that a widespread increase of workplace discrimination claims will occur across the nation.

Bottom Line:

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Title VII applies equally to all employees, regardless of minority or majority-group status. As a result, employers may experience an increase in workplace discrimination claims brought by employees belonging to majority groups. Employers should make sure that all employment-related decisions are based on legitimate workplace needs and should review their current practices and EEO policies. Campbell Durrant attorneys are available to help you with your compliance needs.

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